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Abstract and Keywords
While theorizing about mental faculties had been in decline 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
cognitivism and classical science brought back questions 
about the architecture of mind. Within this framework, Jerry 
Fodor developed a functionalist approach to what he called the 
“modularity of the mind.” While he believes that cognitive 
science can only explain the lower faculties of the mind, 
evolutionary psychology seizes on the notion of modularity and 
transforms it into the radical claim that the mind is modular all 
the way up. By comparison, recent approaches that take 
cognition to be embodied and situated have renewed the 
radical criticism of faculties or modules that was dominant 
from the nineteenth century onward. The concept of module is 
a naturalized successor of the traditional concept of faculty, as 
this chapter shows, and the debate about modules is centrally 
a debate about the possibility of naturalizing the mind.
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1. The Fate of the Faculties in the Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries
Around 1800 the neuroanatomist Franz Joseph Gall (1758–
1828) developed a research method that later on came to be 
known as phrenology. The program was based on the idea that 
the mind consists of several independent mental faculties that 
can be located in different parts or “organs” of the brain.1 The 
kind of taxonomy of mental organs that includes, for example, 
an organ for poetic talent and a sense for architecture, looks 
strange to contemporary readers. What is more, the words 
“Gall” and “phrenology” immediately conjure up wild claims 
about how the mental abilities of a person are mirrored in the 
shape  (p.255) and size of the brain (such that the skull of 
Kant would show a remarkably huge metaphysical organ).
Yet, Gall’s work includes fundamental claims that, as we will 
aim to show in what follows, became part and parcel of the 
reasoning about mental faculties from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century onward. This becomes evident when 
comparing Gall’s theory with the work of the anatomist 
Samuel Thomas Soemmerring (1755–1830), whose treatise On 
the Organ of the Soul was published at about the same time 
that Gall was developing his method. Soemmerring suggested 
that the organ of the soul was located in the fluid of the 
cerebral ventricles and thus attempted to offer a solution to 
the age-old question about the location of the soul inside the 
brain. The book stirred up some considerable controversy. 
(Kant himself wrote an afterword for the book in which he 
claimed that the soul cannot be located at all.)
Soemmerring’s ideas about the soul’s locus in the brain can be 
understood as the end point of a tradition and Gall’s work on 
the multiple mental organs in the brain as the beginning of a 
new research program.2 While Soemmerring joins the long 
tradition of authors who tried to locate the soul or the place of 
the interaction between body and soul in one particular part of 
the brain, Gall remained entirely agnostic about the mind-body 
problem. It seems that he simply took it for granted that the 
distinct mental faculties could be localized in the brain and 
that they altogether made up an intelligent system, even if 
constituting largely independent parts. Not only did Gall 
introduce the idea that the relation between mental functions 
and their location in specific brain areas should be subjected 
to an empirical investigation, he also rejected the speculative 
traditional faculties of imagination, reason, memory, and so on, 
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and instead proposed more specific powers. This establishes 
Gall as the grandfather of the functional decomposition of the 
mind, as it grew influential in cognitive science from the 
middle of the twentieth century onward.
 (p.256) While discussion about the localization of mental 
faculties in the brain remained alive in neuroanatomy all 
through the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, 
traditional accounts of the mental faculties lost their 
explanatory status and role in philosophy at the same time. 
The reasons for this decline are complex. Before we turn to 
the resurrection of faculty psychology in the second half of the 
twentieth century, we will sketch some of those reasons.
As was shown in chapter 4, there is an eliminativist tendency 
in Hume’s account of the faculties. Hume’s associationism 
leads him to propose a reduction of mental faculties to 
patterns of regularly succeeding perceptions and even 
compels him to deny that there should be any cognitive 
powers at all. The principle of the association of ideas, which 
was first introduced by John Locke,3 states that mental 
processes are not to be explained as the products of the 
activity of mental powers, but instead in terms of the relation 
in which mental states stand with their mental successor 
states. David Hume’s systematic and extensive use of this 
principle inspired the British associationist school (including 
David Hartley, James Brown, Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill, 
and Herbert Spencer) to dismiss the faculties in favor of 
investigating the nature and laws of association.4
The principles of association explain both the formation and 
retrieval of different kinds of complex ideas, and the various 
kinds of relations obtaining between those ideas. 
Consequently, there does not appear to be any need for 
ascribing the formation and retrieval of ideas to faculties. A 
memory, for example, is not something formed by the relevant 
faculty and stored and retrieved by it, but is an idea or chain 
of ideas related to past events, which is produced in response 
to a certain external stimulus or an occurrent internal mental 
state. Of course, one might still want to call the set of ideas so 
produced the “faculty of  (p.257) memory”—however, this 
concept would no longer refer to an underlying power. Thus, 
associationism did away with inborn faculties (e.g., memory) 
and, instead, investigated how the functions allegedly 
performed by the traditional faculties could emerge from a 
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combination of elementary psychic elements like ideas or 
sense impressions. Moreover, once the faculties were 
dismissed, there was no need for supposing any longer a soul 
or a mind acting as a vehicle for the faculties, while remaining 
itself inaccessible to empirical investigation. Associationism 
was conceived as offering something like a paradigm for 
scientific psychology, because it allowed getting rid of the 
faculties of the mind—just as Newtonian physics was regarded 
as the paradigm for a science built on a few mechanical laws, 
because it eliminated the need for ascribing active powers and 
qualities to matter. Moreover, associationism was able to 
provide a framework for the emerging experimental study of 
the mind. In the second half of the nineteenth century the 
highly influential psychologist Théodule Ribot provided the 
foundations for a scientific psychology by taking 
associationism as a starting point.5 He amended this empiricist 
foundation, first, by focusing on heredity as a mechanism for 
producing innate dispositions that favor certain kinds of 
association,6 and second, by proposing the scientific study of 
mental diseases.7 Ribot thus founded the French school of 
psychology, which was subsequently developed by his 
followers Jean-Marie Charcot and Pierre Janet.
By the end of the nineteenth century associationist psychology 
was thus very much aligned with experimental psychology and 
the introspective method. Significantly, however, proponents 
of the introspective method were not much in favor of mental 
faculties either. Wilhelm  (p.258) Wundt, one of the founders 
of introspection, identifies consciousness with immediate inner 
experience. Consequently, he holds that the sole aim of 
experimental psychology is the exact description of 
consciousness.8 Experience, and nothing above or beyond it, 
constitutes the subject matter of psychology. Accordingly, the 
objects of inquiry are introspectible mental contents, and not a 
mental substance or mental faculties. Introspection detects 
and identifies nothing but conscious thoughts and experiences, 
where previously mental faculties were supposed to be the 
powers that produce these conscious mental states in a 
structured way.9 The mental faculties are not viewed as 
powers that produced the mental phenomena, but as nominal 
sets uniting a group of inner experiences. Thus, when talking 
about imagination or memory, authors such as Hume, James, 
and Wundt do not refer to mental powers as producers of 
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different kinds of mental states, but rather to terms for 
unifying classes of inner experiences.
At the beginning of the twentieth century critical voices 
against the introspective method grew increasingly louder 
and, with behaviorism, a method turned mainstream that was 
quite opposed to introspective psychology. According to 
behaviorism in the strict sense, psychology is not a science of 
the mind, but rather a science of behavior.10 In principle, 
behavior can be described and explained without any 
reference to internal mental powers and processes. Concepts 
for the mental should be replaced by descriptions of the input 
and behavior patterns that are observable. While introspective 
psychology relied on the introspection of one’s own 
perceptions and experiences, behaviorism decried this 
procedure as a pseudoscientific method and sought to define 
 (p.259) scientific approaches to the mind restrictively in 
terms of phenomena, such as sensory input and behavioral 
output, that are observable from a third person point of view. 
Although behaviorism can be seen as radically opposed to 
introspective psychology, it avoids any reference to traditional 
faculty psychology just as much as introspective psychology 
does, though for slightly different reasons.
As we have shown, the status of the concept of mental 
faculties has been steadily in decline throughout the 
development of modern psychology. The same is true in 
relation to the major currents of philosophy in the twentieth 
century, albeit for rather different driving forces. Many 
influential philosophical movements of the twentieth century 
can be characterized roughly by a reorientation toward the 
practical on the one hand and by what is called the “linguistic 
turn,” on the other. Pragmatism and existentialism can claim 
to be the philosophical movements that mediate theory and 
praxis in the aftermath of Hegelian thought.11 The principle of 
pragmatism identifies the “practical consequences” of a 
theory, concept, or hypothesis by describing how it functions 
as an instrument in thought, analysis, and practical 
deliberation. It is the practical consequences that determine 
the nature of thoughts and concepts, and not their origins in 
mental faculties. The existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre 
rejects the assumption of faculties, because it prioritizes 
existence over essence. What is essential to human beings is 
not fixed by their essence but by what they do and make of 
themselves, in contrast to other entities whose properties and 
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dispositions are determined by the kind of thing they are. 
Human consciousness amounts to a practical interaction with 
the world and is not the result of the actions of some inner 
powers.
Analytic philosophy, in turn, can be characterized by its focus 
on language. Michael Dummett famously defined analytic 
philosophy in claiming “that a philosophical account of 
thought can be attained  (p.260) through a philosophical 
account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive 
account can only be so attained.”12 Once the philosophy of 
language is accorded primacy in philosophical investigations, 
the mental faculties inevitably lose their status as the 
explanans of the mental, if for quite a different reason: it is 
now due to the methodological decision to account for all 
kinds of mental states predominantly by reference to linguistic 
systems or linguistic practices. Putting language first in terms 
of taking into account linguistic practices calls for a blend of 
the practical orientation and the “linguistic turn.”13 This 
combination, in alliance with the behaviorist turn in 
psychology, led to a widespread rejection of the view that 
thought and other mental processes were based in mental 
faculties. A very influential example of this approach and, 
consequently, of a complete rejection of mental faculties is 
provided in Gilbert Ryle’s book The Concept of Mind. Ryle 
devoted his philosophical work to contesting the unhappy 
tendency of philosophers to hypostatize the supposed 
referents of their own concepts. He opposes the idea that 
minds and mental faculties must exist if there is to be a causal 
explanation of intelligent behavior, and the book is therefore 
an examination of various mental concepts, such as knowing, 
learning, imagining, pretending, hoping, wanting, doing 
voluntarily, doing deliberately, perceiving, remembering, and 
so on. As an alternative, Ryle tries to establish connections 
between mental predicates and behavior by proposing that 
statements involving mental terms can be translated into 
subjunctive conditionals about what the individual will do in 
various circumstances. Thus, Ryle offers a dispositional 
analysis of statements involving mental terms into 
dispositional-behavioral  (p.261) statements and tries to show 
that, in using dispositional predicates, we do not refer to 
certain internal mental powers. A radical scientific version of 
behaviorism was also developed by Burrhus Frederic Skinner.
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Cognitive science challenged both the behaviorist outlook and 
the primacy of linguistic analysis and language use, on which 
philosophers like Ryle and tough-minded behaviorists like 
Skinner had relied, and instead offered a new framework for 
understanding the mind—a framework, nonetheless, that made 
space once again for the concept of mental faculties.14 In the 
1950s researchers in psychology, computer science, and 
linguistics began to develop theories of the mind that were 
based on the idea that the mind is a symbol-processing 
machine akin to the computer. Pioneers of computer science, 
such as John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, and 
Herbert Simon, developed programs, for example the General 
Problem Solver,15 that were meant to imitate human 
reasoning. At about the same time, Noam Chomsky rejected 
the behaviorist idea that language could be an acquired habit 
and proposed that one could only explain language 
comprehension in terms of innate mental grammars.16 The 
main argument he marshaled in favor of this claim and in 
opposition to behaviorism was concerned with the concept of 
the “poverty of the stimulus”: Chomsky argued that the spoken 
linguistic data that children are exposed to while learning a 
language hardly suffice for inferring grammatical rules. He 
suggested that children would be unable to distinguish 
grammatically correct from incorrect statements if they did 
not dispose of some kind of innate grammatical knowledge. 
This illustrates  (p.262) how the return to rationalist 
assumptions about the mental had partly an explanatory 
purpose: Chomsky claimed that behaviorist theories have no 
satisfying explanation to offer for how we acquire language 
and that we need to presuppose some inner structure of the 
mind in order to construct a better theory. However, this 
particular attack on Skinner’s behaviorist theory of language 
use was not the only reason for the decline of behaviorism 
during the second half of the twentieth century. Quite 
generally, scientists working on human psychology and animal 
ethology grew increasingly interested in cognitive states that 
do not entertain a direct relation with overt behavioral 
patterns and in cognitive activities that do not depend on prior 
learning (as exemplified in many animals).17 Vision science is a 
case in point, as there are many phenomena in visual 
perception (such as visual illusions, constancy mechanisms, 
and depth perception) that can be explained purely by 
reference to the mechanisms that underlie visual perception.18
Faculties and Modularity
Page 8 of 45
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: 
Universitat Basel; date: 20 June 2018
The return to the inner in early cognitive science was also 
motivated by developments in computer science and artificial 
intelligence. Pioneers in this field, such as Newell and Simon, 
maintained that the latest computer models were symbol-
processing machines and, as such, could be understood as 
concrete proof for the nature of the mind: the mind is a 
symbol-processing software and the brain its machine 
implementation. The respective developments in artificial 
intelligence can therefore be seen as the background for new 
naturalistic approaches to the mind. Whereas nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century psychology had been trying to come 
up with scientific methods for  (p.263) observing the mind 
(from an inner or outer point of view), artificial intelligence 
offered an entirely novel model for thinking about the mind: by 
trying to rebuild it, or rather, by the method of reverse 
engineering as a way of analyzing the mind. Consequently, 
proponents of early cognitive science put forward 
metaphysical claims about the nature of the mind that were 
based on their strong engineering convictions. As a result, the 
inner did not seem to be mysterious anymore.
The computer theory of the mind, that is, the idea that 
thinking is a kind of syntactically structured symbol-
processing, comes hand in hand with theorizing about the 
“cognitive architecture” of the mind, understood in the same 
way as the architecture of computers. More specifically, talk 
about cognitive architecture refers to the functional 
decomposition of the mind, the architecture’s relation to the 
realizing brain (conceived as a machine) and the general 
constraints that this machine/brain puts on what the mind is 
able to accomplish.19 In many early artificial intelligence 
models, the famous von Neumann architecture functions as 
the prototype for the basic architecture of the mind, consisting 
of input and output units, a memory unit, and a central 
processing unit.20
Discussions revolving around “cognitive architecture” can be 
understood as a modern and naturalized version of talk about 
mental faculties. Nevertheless, apart from the analogy with 
the computer, this way of thinking about the architecture or 
structure of the mind also involves a distinctly different 
approach, given its focus on subconscious processing levels. 
These levels can be partly reconstructed theoretically by 
employing research methods based on an objective third 
person perspective, as in neuroanatomical research on brain 
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damage and resultant cognitive impairments of, for example, 
speech perception and face recognition; in psychological 
studies focusing on unconscious, subpersonal processing, for 
example different kinds of memory; and so on.  (p.264) 
Traditional faculty psychology drew intuitive distinctions 
between different mental states like imagining and 
memorizing and hypothesized that they would originate in 
different faculties of the soul. Cognitive science claims instead 
that, for example, speech perception must be a distinct mental 
ability residing in a particular part of the brain, given that it 
can be lost due to brain damage while all other abilities 
remain intact. In the context of twentieth-century cognitive 
science, this shift from the personal to the subpersonal level is 
probably the most significant change in theorizing about the 
faculties.
We have provided a short sketch of the reasons for the decline 
of faculty psychology in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In the aftermath of Hume’s empiricist 
program, psychology—in the shape of associationism, 
introspective psychology, and behaviorism—dismissed mental 
faculties. The same was true for the major currents in 
philosophy in the twentieth century, due to their practical or 
linguistic orientation or both. Yet, within the framework of the 
cognitivist paradigm in the cognitive science of the mind, the 
mind’s supposedly innate powers, inner structure, and 
architecture moved, once again, to the center of interest. 
Gall’s core idea to correlate mental faculties, that are also 
more fine-grained than traditionally assumed, with identifiable 
segments of a given cognitive architecture (which is itself 
localized in some specific brain areas, as empirically 
established), reemerges emphatically within the framework of 
cognitive science. The birth of cognitive science as well as of 
contemporary philosophy of mind marked the renaissance of a 
robust philosophical interest in the mind and its powers. In 
contrast to the philosophical investigations of the mind during 
past centuries, theorizing about the faculties is now taking 
place within the framework of cognitive science. This new 
orientation offers the opportunity for establishing a 
naturalistic understanding of the mind and the mental 
faculties.21
 (p.265) 2. Modularity, Cognitive Science, and Naturalism
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We now want to argue that the notions of module and 
modularity, as they are currently used in cognitive science, are 
naturalized successor concepts that replace the traditional 
mental faculties. This claim should be understood in the 
following way: In the broad Aristotelian tradition that runs 
from ancient to early modern philosophy, the faculties of the 
soul can be divided into the lower ones, namely the sensory 
and the appetitive faculties, and the higher ones, namely the 
intellectual and volitional faculties.22 The lower faculties 
comprise not only the appetites and the passions as well as the 
visual, auditory, tactile, and other kinds of perception but also 
memory, imagination, and estimation.23 The higher faculties 
comprise the capacities for forming concepts, beliefs, and 
inferences; for making choices and for taking decisions. The 
subdivision is real because each faculty is supposed to be 
dedicated to specific objects; in modern parlance, the faculties 
are “domain-specific.”24 For instance, the visual faculty deals 
with colors, the auditory faculty with sounds, the intellectual 
faculty with concepts, and so on. Roughly, humans and the 
higher animals share the lower faculties, yet the human mind 
is distinctive in that it also features the higher faculties. There 
has been some debate in early modern philosophy about 
whether the  (p.266) higher faculties characteristic of the 
human mind are part of the natural (material) world. 
Descartes and Malebranche were opposed to this idea, while 
Hobbes and Hume were its defenders. As we will show, this 
question is still pertinent within the naturalistic framework of 
the contemporary philosophy of mind. While Jerry Fodor 
argues that higher cognitive abilities cannot be understood as 
modular and that cognitive science has so far no means at its 
disposal for properly conceptualizing the central cognitive 
system, Peter Carruthers and other authors claim that, in 
order to understand the mind in a naturalistic framework, one 
needs to assume that it is modular all the way up.25
Within contemporary cognitive science, the traditional division 
between higher and lower faculties is reproduced in the 
distinction between low-level and high-level cognitive systems. 
As we have already shown, the important difference between 
traditional theorizing about higher and lower faculties and 
modern proposals about higher and lower cognition is that 
modern cognitive science focuses most of all on third person 
methods of investigating subpersonal processes in order to try 
and verify claims about the underlying realizing mechanisms. 
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One important reason for supposing that there exists a specific 
difference, for example, between perception and higher 
cognition, stems from research on perceptual illusions, which 
typically persist even when the viewer knows the real 
character of the stimulus. For example, if a subject knows that 
the two lines of the Mueller-Lyer illusion are the same length, 
the subject still persists in perceiving them to be of unequal 
length. The perceptual representation of the stimulus by the 
visual system is, as is aptly said, “cognitively impenetrable” by 
the subject’s knowledge stored in the central cognitive 
systems.26 The visual system apparently operates in isolation 
and produces the percept of the  (p.267) Mueller-Lyer illusion 
untouched by the potential influence of reason or some other 
higher-level system(s).
Attempts at capturing phenomena, such as the independence 
of visual processing, and the respective theorizing about 
independent faculties or relatively independent functional 
units have led to the concept of the modularity of the mind. 
Within this paradigm, the functional units of the mind that 
realize certain abilities, like speech perception or face 
recognition, have now been labeled “modules.” In effect, those 
modules can be understood as the naturalized successor 
concepts of the concept of the faculties. They are what 
constitutes today’s supposed architecture of the mind, even if 
they reside at a subconscious and more fine-grained level than 
the traditionally supposed faculties of the soul.
Fodor was the first to establish the notion of the modularity of 
the mind in philosophy, with the explicit goal of reviving 
faculty psychology. Very roughly, a module can be 
characterized as a dissociable and relatively autonomous 
cognitive mechanism with a certain function or purpose. It is 
central to Fodor, but not to other defenders of modularity, that 
the lower cognitive systems do not receive input from the 
higher cognitive systems. They are, in this sense, cognitively 
impenetrable. Yet the higher cognitive systems are not 
modular, for they do receive informational input from the low-
level systems and other higher systems. His proposal can 
therefore be labeled the “moderate modularity” hypothesis.27
According to other philosophers and cognitive scientists,28
however, the (human) mind consists more or less exclusively of 
numerous  (p.268) cognitive systems, both low-level and high-
level. Each system communicates with a limited number of 
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other systems while having little influence on the processes 
going on inside other systems. Put differently, the (human) 
mind is entirely made up of modules. This means that both 
peripheral low-level cognitive systems and central high-level 
cognitive systems are modular. This is called the “massive 
modularity” hypothesis or, more critically, the “promiscuous 
modularity” hypothesis.29 As will become clear, the concept of 
massive modularity both weakens the notion of what a module 
is and blurs the traditional distinction between lower and 
higher faculties. The difference between defenders of 
moderate modularity—most notably Fodor himself—and 
defenders of massive modularity is that the latter apply 
adaptationist reasoning to the structure of the mind, while the 
former shrink back from Darwinian interpretations of 
modularity.
Despite these differences, both theories of modularity agree 
that the faculties have to be explained naturalistically and 
both agree that all or at least some of the traditional and the 
folk-psychological notions of the faculties refer to subpersonal 
(and perhaps naturally purposeful) mechanisms that account 
for the cognitive capacities of higher animals and humans. In 
addition, there may be modules that do not feature in folk-
psychological or traditional theories of the mental faculties, 
such as modules for speech perception, mind reading, and the 
notorious “cheater-detection-module.” In general, current 
theorizing in cognitive science about the architecture of the 
mind differs most significantly from traditional approaches in 
its tendency to multiply mental faculties at the subpersonal 
level. This tendency can ultimately be traced back to Gall and 
the dawn of phrenology in the late eighteenth century.
 (p.269) The connection with the traditional concept of the 
mental faculties seems obvious: The moderate modularity 
thesis claims that the traditional lower faculties are modular 
(in the strong sense) whereas the traditional higher faculties 
are not. By contrast, the massive modularity thesis claims that 
both the lower and the higher faculties are modular (in the 
weak sense). All contemporary theories of modularity deny 
that the traditional lower and higher faculties are faculties of 
the soul, since souls of any kind are not a proper part of a 
naturalistic picture. Modularity theories conceive of faculties 
as psychological capacities of organisms (higher animals and 
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humans) that are realized in the brain. Moreover, both the 
moderate and the massive modularity theses claim that the 
faculties referred to by folk-psychological notions are 
constituted by subpersonal capacities.
Hence, “modules” is a successor concept to the traditional 
“mental faculties,” though modules tend to be defined in a 
more fine-grained manner and are said to be located at the 
subpersonal level. But what about the idea that “modules” is a 
naturalized successor concept? First, one should acknowledge 
that the term “naturalism” does not have a precise meaning. 
Generally speaking, naturalists hold that reality entirely 
consists of nature as specifically defined by the natural 
sciences and hold that scientific methods must be used for 
investigating any part of reality, including the human mind. 
Thus, naturalism entails both an ontological and a 
methodological claim. The ontological aspect revolves around 
the idea that reality has no place for “supernatural” entities; 
the methodological aspect involves attributing a kind of 
general authority to the scientific method over other methods 
in investigating reality. Both aspects are captured in the 
slogan that philosophy has to be continuous with the natural 
sciences. Thus, for mental faculties to form a part of nature, as 
understood by the natural sciences, they have to be able to 
make a causal difference in the spatiotemporal world. And for 
the mental faculties to be natural faculties, they have to be 
realized by concrete mechanisms in living organisms.
Traditionally, the mental faculties denominate specific 
capacities with a cognitive purpose. However, from a 
naturalistic perspective,  (p.270) discussions about cognitive 
capacities and cognitive purpose remain superficial as long as 
no account is provided of the particular mechanisms that 
supposedly realize the cognitive capacities in question. As we 
showed in the preceding section, the particular framework 
employed in cognitive science facilitates investigations of the 
mind in terms of cognitive architecture rather than mental 
faculties and thus encourages research into different kinds of 
information processing units that are realized in the brain and 
can solve certain tasks.
The representational states produced by modular cognitive 
systems are said to be sensitive only to certain kinds of 
information and to operate in relative isolation from other 
cognitive systems. As discussed previously, a module can be 
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very roughly characterized as a dissociable and relatively 
autonomous cognitive mechanism with a certain function or 
purpose. This idea of a module is well embedded in traditional 
cognitive science, given that it is firmly committed to the 
modular approach in the study of cognition. The mind is taken 
to be a computational device composed of functionally 
specifiable and detachable mechanisms, and functional 
decomposition is therefore a central aim of classical cognitive 
science.30
Yet, despite the fact that the notion of modularity is well 
embedded in cognitive science, there seems to be no generally 
accepted understanding of what a module is and what the 
thesis of the modularity of mind is supposed to amount to.31
We have already seen that there are two versions of the 
modularity thesis: moderate modularity and massive 
modularity. However, there are also two interpretations of 
what a module is supposed to be: a weaker and a stronger one, 
both of which  (p.271) we will discuss later in more detail. 
Finally, there are also two different ways of integrating 
modules into a naturalistic framework: either one emphasizes 
that modules are cognitive mechanisms and, hence, relies 
methodologically on cognitive psychology in realizing the 
naturalization project; or one highlights that modules must 
have a purpose and therefore relies on evolutionary biology in 
accomplishing the naturalization project.
So, what exactly is meant by the term “module”? And what 
precisely is the thesis of the modularity of the mind? We will 
first sketch an answer to both of these questions in the terms 
of moderate modularity, as it is defended by Fodor. 
Subsequently, we will turn to the standard reply given by 
defenders of massive modularity, and specifically by 
Carruthers.
3. Fodor: The Modularity of (Some Parts of the) Mind
The most prominent attempt of reestablishing faculty 
psychology within philosophy of mind and cognitive science in 
recent decades has been the approach developed by Jerry 
Fodor in his The Modularity of Mind. The modularity thesis 
defended by Fodor represents a particular version of faculty 
psychology, which emphasizes how the “lower” faculties have 
only restricted access to information, and distinguishes them 
from more global “higher” cognitive processes.
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According to Fodor, the variety and special functions of our 
cognitive activities can be explained with reference to the 
existence of such subpersonal task-specific modules. Fodor 
subscribes to the idea that, in order to explain specific 
cognitive activities, one needs to appeal to the “functional 
architecture” of the mind as the engine of all these activities. 
The building blocks for such an architecture comprise faculties 
that can be individuated with respect to their causes and 
effects (rather than with regard to their location in the brain 
or the kind of innate ideas they might entail). Classical 
functionalist approaches to the mind characterize cognitive 
states in terms of their causal roles. (To give a  (p.272) 
somewhat simplified example, pain is the neuronal state that is 
caused by nociceptive input and normally causes pain 
behavior. If there is pain perception without actual nociceptive 
input, perhaps accompanied by abnormal behavior, pain is 
identified with the activation of those neuronal states that 
usually mediate between pain inputs and outputs.) Fodor 
straightforwardly applies this view to faculties, claiming that 
“the language faculty is whatever is the normal cause of one’s 
ability to speak.”32 However, such a claim should not lead to 
the conclusion that a faculty exists for every single capacity 
we possess. This would evidently lead to the absurd 
consequence that we would need to stipulate a faculty that 
underlies, say, the ability for adding one and one, and another 
ability for adding one and two, and so on. For not every 
behavior we display differs in its function and etiology 
fundamentally from every other one. A functionalist faculty 
psychology is therefore tasked to find the causal uniformities 
in behavior underneath the heterogeneity of surface 
appearances. The guiding idea in the background, therefore, is 
to apply a kind of reverse engineering to the mind: while we 
could of course conceive of a single machine or mechanism 
that accomplishes all kinds of additions and even arithmetic 
operations, it would appear unlikely that this very mechanism 
should also be able to detect colors or trigger flight behavior.
While the insistence on the mind’s functional architecture 
distinguishes Fodor’s view from other approaches, such as 
Chomsky’s theory, not all functionalists are committed to the 
kind of faculties that Fodor stipulates. However, what would 
appear to be uncontroversial among functionalists is the claim 
that the mind shows a kind of functional decomposition, that 
is, that the mind contains systems that can be distinguished by 
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the functions they serve. Nevertheless, even though Fodor’s 
modularity hypothesis is a claim about what kinds of systems 
there are and what they are like and, therefore, can only be 
developed  (p.273) within a functionalist framework, his 
proposal is not the only interpretation that such a functionalist 
framework permits.
Fodor suggests capturing the architecture of the mind by way 
of a threefold functional taxonomy that distinguishes 
transducers, input systems, and central systems, as follows.
Transducers are subsidiary systems that have the function of 
providing the system with information about changes in the 
environment. While a Turing machine, for example, is a closed 
system operating merely on the restricted amount of 
information that it receives from its tape, living organisms 
steadily exchange information with their environments and, 
thus, their computations are continuously affected by what 
happens around them. Such transducers are always organs 
that convert energy impinging on the organism’s surface, such 
as the retina or cochlea, into nerve signals. The outputs of 
transducer systems specify the distribution of proximal stimuli 
at the organism’s surfaces, without producing inferences 
about the distal objects causing the stimulation.
Input systems are designed to deliver information to the 
central systems; more specifically, they mediate between 
transducer outputs and central cognitive mechanisms by 
producing mental representations out of the data delivered by 
the transducers and presenting them to the central cognitive 
mechanisms for further processing. According to this view, 
there are substantially more mechanisms that can be 
identified as different input systems than just the five senses. 
What Fodor has in mind are highly specialized computational 
mechanisms that generate hypotheses about the distal sources 
of proximal stimulation, such as mechanisms for color 
perception or the analysis of shapes or three-dimensional 
relations, for example in the case of vision.33
Such input systems constitute a natural kind, that is, a class of 
entities that share many scientifically interesting properties 
and cannot be  (p.274) reduced to other more fundamental 
faculties of the mind. What input systems have in common as a 
natural kind can be summarized in a simple phrase: input 
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systems are modules. That is, input systems are exactly the 
kind of objects Gall was right about. Fodor lists specifically 
nine characteristic criteria that identify a module:
1. Domain specific: Fodor harks back to Gall’s idea that 
there are distinct psychological mechanisms 
corresponding to distinct stimulus domains and argues 
that Gall was correct with regard to the input 
processing systems.34 The question of how many 
modules there are (partly) depends on the question of 
how many mechanisms there are that respond only to 
stimuli from a certain domain. The latter is essentially 
an empirical question.
2. Informationally encapsulated: Modules are restricted 
with regard to the information they take into account 
before producing an output. A perceptual hypothesis, 
for example, about the distance or size of an object, 
may be based on considerably less data than the 
organism as a whole has access to. The operations of 
input systems are effectively unaffected by top-down 
feedback, such as theoretical knowledge with regard to 
how the distance and size of objects tend to vary under 
certain perceptual conditions. Informational 
encapsulation therefore explains the persistence of 
perceptual illusions. Domain specificity and 
informational encapsulation are different features of a 
module and could, at least in principle, come apart. 
There could be a system that only reacts to a certain 
kind of stimulus but is sensitive to all kinds of top-down 
feedback; yet there could also be a system that reacts 
to all kinds of stimulus without, however, integrating 
 (p.275) any top-down feedback concerning the 
system’s background knowledge. According to Fodor, 
the intriguing aspect about modules is that they always 
display both features concurrently.
3. Mandatory: Modules operate in an automatic mode. 
An individual cannot help but read the letters she sees, 
hear an utterance as an utterance, and be afraid when 
hearing a sudden loud noise. Input systems are 
constrained to operate unfailingly whenever an 
opportunity presents itself. This is what distinguishes 
them from central representational capacities that are 
under “executive control”: we apply them in a manner 
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that is conducive to the satisfaction of our goals, while 
perception operates purely automatically without 
regard to any immediate concerns.
4. Fast: Processing in input systems is fast when 
compared with the relatively slow processing occurring 
in paradigmatic central systems like problem-solving. 
Fodor classifies cognitive processes as fast if they take 
place in half a second, at most. Remarkably, according 
to this claim, being fast is a direct result of being 
mandatory and informationally encapsulated. However, 
automatic processes are therefore in a certain sense 
unintelligent—they can operate fast because they 
merely consider a stereotyped subset of the whole 
range of computational options available to the 
organism.
5. Inaccessible: Input analysis typically involves 
mediated mappings from transducer outputs onto 
percepts. A system is inaccessible if these intermediate 
levels of processing are not available to consciousness 
and explicit reports. Central systems like memory can 
freely access the content of modules only at their 
output level. Inaccessibility and encapsulation are 
therefore two sides of the same coin: while 
inaccessibility involves restrictions on the flow of 
information emanating  (p.276) from a module, 
encapsulation involves restrictions on the information 
flow entering the mechanism.35
6. Shallow: Since modules are informationally 
encapsulated, we should not expect their outputs to be 
theoretically demanding concepts. The output of the 
visual detectors, for example, is shallow, that is, there 
should be visual output representations that do not 
categorize visual stimuli in terms of biological or 
chemical kinds, but form a level of representation by 
some criterion independent of theoretical knowledge. 
Fodor suggests that the outputs of modular systems are 
understood as basic-level concepts,36 which can be 
acquired during direct observation rather than by 
inferential reasoning.
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7. Localized: Fodor assumes that there is a 
characteristic neural architecture associated with the 
input systems. Hardwired connections are supposed to 
facilitate the information flow between different neural 
structures inside a module, but they thereby also 
restrict it to the module. Neural architecture is 
therefore the natural concomitant of informational 
encapsulation.
8. Subject to characteristic and specific breakdown 
patterns: A suitable criterion for a system’s functionally 
dissociable character is whether it can be impaired, for 
example as the result of a brain lesion, without other 
cognitive systems being significantly impacted. 
Disorders such as prosopognosia (impaired face 
recognition), achromatopsia (total color blindness), and 
agrammatism (loss of syntax) occur in individuals 
independently of any other impairments.37 Specific 
breakdown patterns are also good evidence for neural 
 (p.277) localizability, since the breakdown of one 
particular module in the course of a lesion in a certain 
part of the brain renders it highly likely not only that 
the system in question is localized in the area in 
question but also that this area is dedicated exclusively
to the realization of the very system.38
9. Ontogenetically determined: The ontogeny of input 
systems exhibits a characteristic pace and sequencing. 
Modules are innate faculties that are either present 
already shortly after birth, as seems the case with 
visual categorization, or develop “according to specific, 
endogenously determined patterns under the impact of 
environmental releasers.”39 The commitment to strong 
claims about innateness forms part and parcel of 
faculty psychology from Gall through to Chomsky.
Central systems are the nonmodular systems that constitute 
the “higher cognitive mind” and enable creative and holistic 
reasoning processes. Fodor assumes that in addition to the 
input systems there must also be nonmodular systems that 
evaluate and exploit the information provided by the input 
systems. These higher cognitive systems are neither domain-
specific nor encapsulated, but instead cut across domains and 
also have global access to information. Even though 
candidates might include, for example, choice formation and 
decision-making systems or what was traditionally called “the 
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will,” Fodor focuses entirely on the formation of belief based 
on prior perceptual processing, which he describes as an 
evaluation of how things look in the light of background 
information.
Fodor takes it that, given the cognitive abilities we have, it is 
necessary to assume the existence of nonmodular systems 
where the representations  (p.278) provided by input systems 
can interface. The mechanisms of belief formation cannot be 
modular because it is precisely the point of such mechanisms 
to ensure that what the organism believes is determined by a 
process that tests and corrects the information that is 
provided by the input systems in the light of all the 
background knowledge the individual has.
The problem is that in the case of a domain-general system 
where every representation is sensitive to any other one we 
have no conception of how to build such a structure. Given 
how clueless reverse engineering appears to be when faced 
with a global mechanism of belief formation, Fodor postulates 
what he—with a twinkle in the eye—calls “Fodor’s First Law of 
the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” namely that “the 
more global … a process is, the less anybody understands it.”40
The main function of a threefold architecture, such as the one 
just sketched, is to isolate perceptual analysis from certain 
effects of background belief. Input analysis is therefore 
thought to take place in modules, which, according to Fodor, 
represent a functionally definable subset of the mind and 
share a certain functional role. They receive input from a 
transducer and integrate this information in order to produce 
a distal representation of the external stimulus.
Fodor’s explicit goal is to come up with “an overall taxonomy 
of cognitive systems,”41 as a way of developing a 
contemporary version of faculty psychology. Yet, when 
comparing Fodor’s results with traditional positions, it is 
striking that his account is mainly dedicated to drawing a 
distinction between perceptual input analysis and belief 
formation. Fodor therefore leaves many questions entirely 
unanswered as regards the individuation of faculties. First of 
all, it is unclear how many modules there are supposed to be. 
It seems patent that modules do not mirror common-sense 
psychology and that we should expect modules  (p.279) to 
represent mechanisms that are more fine-grained than, for 
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example, the five senses, memory, imagination, and so on. 
Examples of modules that Fodor mentions include mechanisms 
dedicated to color perception, mechanisms that assign 
grammatical descriptions to token utterances, and 
mechanisms for face-recognition.42
Even leaving to one side the question of how to individuate 
input systems, there might also be modules with entirely 
different functions beyond input analysis, such as those 
involved in triggering motoric behavior. While these systems 
would probably share some characteristics with input systems, 
in terms of being fast, automatic, and domain-specific, other 
standard criteria simply do not seem to apply to motor 
behavior systems, such as the property of “producing shallow 
output.” Fodor does not say anything about how to individuate 
these systems and where to situate them in his threefold 
architecture.
Furthermore, Fodor remains silent about the conative aspect 
of the higher cognitive mechanisms, such as different kinds of 
choice formation and decision-making, or what has 
traditionally been labeled “the will.” Finally, there are the 
traditional lower faculties in addition to the senses or input-
systems, such as memory and imagination, where it is hard to 
see how they could fit into Fodor’s architecture of the mind at 
all. According to traditional faculty psychology, they belong to 
the lower faculties, yet they hardly fit Fodor’s central criteria 
for being a module, namely, that they should be domain-
specific and informationally encapsulated. But even if Fodor 
would alternatively include them with the higher cognitive 
faculties, he would need to say something more about how 
their particular function distinguishes them from belief 
formation. However, Fodor does not touch on any of these 
questions.
It should be evident from the foregoing remarks that Fodor 
does not really aim at a complete taxonomy of the mental 
faculties. He is rather using faculty psychology as a 
background theory for establishing two  (p.280) claims: first, 
that perception is cognitively impenetrable and, second, that 
cognitive science cannot account for higher cognitive 
processing.
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As regards the first claim, Fodor employs faculty psychology in 
drawing a clear-cut distinction between perception and 
cognition, thereby accounting for the cognitive impenetrability 
of perception. Such a clear-cut distinction is meant as an 
argument against cognitivist tendencies in psychology that 
focus on top-down processing running from cognition to 
perception.43 Fodor objects that such an account blurs the 
difference between perception and cognition and suggests 
instead that perception should be perceived as a tertium quid: 
Perception is “smart,” like cognition, in that it is usually 
inferential, yet it is also “dumb,” like reflexes, in that it is 
informationally encapsulated.44 The functional conflict 
between inference and encapsulation that might arise from 
this situation is resolved by assuming that such mechanisms 
have only sharply delimited access to background theories. 
The essential criterion of modularity, that is, informational 
encapsulation, therefore remains the key feature in explaining 
why and how perception must be strictly distinguished from 
global cognitive processing. What Fodor is objecting to here is 
the idea that perception could be theory-relative, namely, in 
itself biased by the background knowledge the individual has. 
Relativism, Fodor argues, overlooks the predetermined 
structure of human nature and underestimates our capacity 
for securing objective information about the world via our 
perceptual systems.45
The second claim to the effect that cognitive science cannot 
account for higher cognitive processing is articulated in the 
already mentioned  (p.281) “Law of the Nonexistence of 
Cognitive Science.” Cognitive science, according to Fodor, has 
made good progress in explaining how modules work. But 
central systems cannot be explained as modular systems, 
since:
(1) Central systems are in charge of belief formation.
(2) Belief formation is a global process that can access all 
the information the system has.
(3) Global processes cannot be modular since modules 
are domain-specific and encapsulated.
(4) Therefore, the central system cannot be modular.
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The problem with cognitive science seems to be that it has 
often treated central systems as if they were modular: 
“Intellectual capacities were divided into what seem, in 
retrospect, to be quite arbitrary sub-departments (proving 
theorems of elementary logic; pushing blocks around; ordering 
hamburgers). … What emerged was a picture of the mind that 
looked rather embarrassingly like a Sears catalogue.”46 It is 
therefore not surprising that Fodor does not distinguish 
different kinds of higher cognitive faculties and their 
functions. According to Fodor, such finer taxonomies can be 
tentatively devised in relation to modules by taking the 
relevant psychological research into account. However, 
psychological reasoning about the higher cognitive abilities of 
the mind appears to be so unconvincing in Fodor’s view that 
he prefers to remain altogether silent about the details of 
higher cognitive processing, adhering instead to the maxim: 
better no explanation than a bad explanation.
Nevertheless, such a radical line of argument raises more 
questions than it seems to answer. In dividing cognitive 
faculties into input systems that can be explained by reverse 
engineering and higher cognitive faculties that cannot be 
explained at all, Fodor’s account shows a  (p.282) remarkable 
resemblance to Descartes’s distinction between the body-
dependent and the pure cognitive faculties.47 It seems rather 
surprising, however, that such a resemblance should emerge 
from within a naturalistic framework. For Descartes, the pure 
intellect is part of a distinct substance, namely, the res 
cogitans, which is immortal and not extended in space. Fodor 
certainly does not aim at reestablishing Cartesianism in this 
comprehensive sense. Yet, again, the only thing this point 
illustrates is that Fodor does not aim at establishing any 
comprehensive approach to the faculties of the mind at all. 
Instead his concept of modules is meant to establish that input 
systems cannot be penetrated by global cognition and that we 
are far away from having a plausible theory of how global 
cognition works.
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4. Massive Modularity
It is remarkable that Fodor’s outlook should not only question 
the explanatory power of cognitive science but also the 
naturalist framework of explanation. This approach is based 
on his idea that there can be no cognitive science explanation 
of the central system and that computational-cum-
representational explanations are the only viable scientific 
explanations of mental processes. If it is true that we do not 
have the slightest idea of how to describe the structure of 
higher cognitive processes in terms of reverse engineering, 
then at least those parts of the mind that are central or global 
simply cannot be captured in terms of computation. And, 
according to Fodor, cognitive scientists who have tried to 
explain the whole mind in computational terms have so far just 
chased it back further into the machine without really 
understanding its way of functioning.48
 (p.283) Evolutionary psychologists have questioned this view 
by arguing that higher cognitive abilities might likewise be 
described as modular, once we just loosen the criteria for what 
it takes to be a module. The basic argument for massive 
modularity applies the general structure of evolutionary and 
adaptive processes to the architecture of the mind.49
Accordingly, we should not expect the mind to have one 
central system running on one general-purpose rule of 
reasoning or one kind of representational format, since 
“different adaptive problems frequently have different optimal 
solutions, and can therefore be solved more efficiently by the 
application of different problem-solving procedures.”50
According to this view, natural selection is likely to have 
produced many different specialized mental rules for 
reasoning about various evolutionarily important domains.
The main argument for massive modularity can therefore be 
called the “argument from design”;51 it can be represented in 
the following form:
(1) Biological systems are designed systems that are 
constructed incrementally.
(2) Such systems, if complex, need to have massively 
modular organization.
(3) The human mind is a biological system, and it is 
complex.
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(4) So, the human mind will be massively modularly 
organized.
 (p.284) According to Carruthers, the design argument relies 
on a further argument, which states that our minds have 
evolved gradually from the minds of other animals. It can 
therefore be labeled “the continuity argument”:
(1) The minds of nonhuman animals are massively 
modular in their organization.
(2) Evolution is characteristically conservative, 
preserving and modifying existing structures rather than 
starting afresh.
(3) We can expect that the human mind should be 
organized along massively modular lines.
By stressing the continuity between animal and human minds, 
the continuity argument supports the central claim advanced 
in the third step of the argument from design, namely, that the 
human mind is a biological system. A central system, such as 
the one described by Fodor, is not completely impossible but is 
highly unlikely, according to this kind of reasoning, since it 
would require higher cognition to have been the product of 
one single macro-mutation, instead of being the result of a 
complex incremental process that developed many task-
specific mechanisms over time.
While it seems plausible that the principles of evolutionary 
development speak in favor of a mental architecture that is 
modular all the way up, one might wonder about how Fodor’s 
notion of modularity relates to Carruthers’s claims. As we have 
shown, Fodor’s notion is meant to fit only input systems. By 
contrast, advocates of massive modularity tend to use the 
notion of modularity in a much weaker sense. The weakest 
sense that underlies many accounts in evolutionary psychology 
takes a module simply to be a dissociable functional 
component of the mind. Such a conception of modularity is not 
even restricted to the mind, but is rather meant to describe 
the whole living organism as an organization composed of 
functional components that themselves consist of assemblies 
of subcomponents, reaching from individual  (p.285) organs 
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at the top level down to cellular assemblies and processes 
involving genes at the bottom level.
Once we define a module in this way, however, it is 
questionable whether the proposal that the mind is modular all 
the way up remains a controversial claim. Fodor might 
perfectly well agree that higher cognitive abilities divide into 
subparts, such as the intellect and the will, and that these 
parts have different functions—provided only that these 
functional components of the mind are not perceived as 
domain-specific, encapsulated, and so on, but instead as global 
general-purpose mechanisms. It turns out therefore that the 
conclusions of Carruthers’s arguments, instead of directly 
contradicting Fodor’s approach, in fact use a weaker notion of 
modularity.
Nevertheless, the concept of massive modularity is far from 
being uncontroversial and is explicitly rejected not only by 
Fodor but by several others. As we will show, however, massive 
modularity is not controversial merely because of how 
modules are defined, but because of the way the concept is 
used in dividing up the whole mind—including higher 
cognition—into a range of different systems and subsystems 
that are perceived as adaptations to particular problems that 
our ancestors faced. What renders massive modularity 
controversial is therefore not the claim that the mind is 
modular all the way up—since this claim simply relies on a 
weaker definition of what a module is—but rather the way in 
which specifically biological explanations are applied to 
reasoning about the architecture of the mind.
A closer look at the account developed by Carruthers will 
underline this point. He argues that our minds have the 
general structure of a perception-belief-desire-planning-motor-
control architecture, which is of “ancient ancestry” and can 
already be found in insects and spiders.52 To be a believer-
desirer in this sense means that one possesses distinct 
content-bearing belief and desire states that are discrete, 
structured, and causally efficacious in virtue of their structural 
properties.  (p.286) Just as does Fodor, Carruthers therefore 
subscribes both to a realist position with regard to belief-
desire psychology and to an overall model of the mind that 
Susan Hurley has labeled “the sandwich model of mind.”53
This model takes perception and action to be distinct units (or 
peripheral systems) and cognition to be interposed between 
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these two units. In claiming that the belief-desire psychology is 
realized in the brain, both Fodor and Carruthers offer strong, 
rich ontological claims about the localization and structure of 
the mental faculties. According to Carruthers, such a rich 
mental structure must in fact be ascribed to all organisms that 
show at least some behavior that does not reduce to fixed 
action patterns.54 The fact that even bees and spiders show 
apparently various forms of spatial reasoning and planning 
forces us to conceive of them as believers-desirers in the 
minimal sense, including any ontological consequences that 
such a claim might entail. Belief-desire architectures, in the 
sense of distinct, causally efficacious structures, must be 
ascribed to all organisms with a central nervous system in 
order to account for the flexibility of their behavior. Mental 
capacities cannot be explained merely as a result of 
associations, nor flexible behaviors as fixed action patterns or 
conditioned responses. As an approach to the overall structure 
of the mind, behaviorism and associationism are therefore 
already excluded at the level of insects. Elucidating the 
capacity for learning and the various abilities of organisms 
with a central nervous system presupposes that we assume a 
rich inner structure.
This then raises the question of what the structure of the mind 
looks like at a more fine-grained level. Perception, belief 
formation, desire, planning, and motor control systems can be 
understood to represent systems that are reminiscent of the 
traditional faculties. Yet, even if all of these decompose into 
many different functional subsystems, such modules should 
not be thought of as physically distinct objects, but  (p.287) 
instead need to be understood as cognitive systems. However, 
this does not entail that modules should not be localizable in 
the brain; on the contrary, even though they must not be 
assumed to be localizable in one single place, they can be 
spread over various parts of the brain. While modules are 
supposed to be realized somewhere in the brain, however, they 
are still individuated by their function and not by their location 
in the brain. Up to this point, then, Carruthers’s and Fodor’s 
accounts are in agreement.
A major difference between Fodor and Carruthers opens up, 
however, when it comes to Carruthers’s particular focus on the 
general rules of evolutionary design processes and the way he 
extrapolates from this background model several design 
constraints with regard to the mind’s architecture. When 
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thinking about the design of modules, we have to keep in 
mind, according to Carruthers, that modules are biologically 
derived systems that developed by co-opting and connecting 
resources in novel ways. Evolution needs to be able to add 
new functions without disrupting existing ones; and it needs to 
be able to tinker with the operations of a given functional 
subsystem. We should expect different modules therefore to 
have complex input and output connections with one another 
and in fact to be sharing parts on a massive scale. Since brain 
processing is relatively slow, we should furthermore expect 
massive parallelism and duplication of structure whenever 
signaling distances increase beyond a certain point or 
different sorts of information need to be processed within the 
same restricted time frame.
According to Carruthers, Fodor’s criteria of a module’s having 
proprietary transducers and shallow outputs will have to be 
dropped simply because they only apply to input systems. 
Carruthers furthermore denies that fast processing is an 
interesting criterion for distinguishing between different 
mental systems. Although he is in favor of strong nativism, 
Carruthers also drops innateness as a necessary criterion, 
simply because there might be some modules that are to a 
large degree acquired through learning. Nevertheless, 
interestingly, Carruthers adopts  (p.288) Fodor’s criteria that 
modules are domain-specific, that is, that they process only a 
certain kind of input and are mandatory in the sense that they 
automatically process any input that matches their target 
domain.55 In claiming that all modules work in this way, 
including those that are part of higher cognitive decision-
making, Carruthers effectively denies that there is any 
interesting concept of free will or any significant difference 
between mandatory cognitive processing on lower and higher 
levels.
In his most important departure from Fodor, however, 
Carruthers also rejects the claim that encapsulation is 
necessary, where of course Fodor very clearly insists that 
encapsulation is the most important property identifying a 
module.56 Nevertheless, on closer inspection, it turns out that 
Carruthers merely modifies Fodor’s claim rather than denying 
it outright: both Carruthers and Fodor agree that we should 
think of the design of the mind in terms of “computational 
frugality.” It is impossible that every system of the mind should 
have access to every kind of information processed elsewhere. 
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Nevertheless, Carruthers doubts that frugality requires 
encapsulation in such a strong sense. The idea of 
encapsulation derives from a tradition of thinking about the 
mind according to which information search was deemed to be 
exhaustive and algorithms were supposed to be designed so as 
to be optimally reliable. With reference to the work of Gerd 
Gigerenzer and his colleagues,57 Carruthers suggests that we 
instead think about mental processes in terms of simple 
heuristics. Processing rules of the mind have been designed to 
be good enough, but not perfect. To  (p.289) repeat, while 
Carruthers’s notion of a module is much weaker than Fodor’s, 
the background idea is to suppose certain design constraints 
and then produce a model of the mind that satisfies them. In 
this context, heuristics is seen as the outcome of selective 
processes that mediate a compromise between speed and 
reliability. Certain memory systems or social skills are 
encapsulated not in the narrow sense of having no access at 
all to information external to the system. Rather, these 
modules need to be described as being encapsulated in a wide 
sense: they have access to a very limited amount of 
information outside the system, which they access via 
structure-sensitive searching rules. According to Carruthers, 
the Fodorian argument for computational tractability does not 
warrant a claim about encapsulation as traditionally 
understood. It merely warrants what could be labeled “the 
wide-scope version” of the encapsulation claim: The mind 
should be constructed entirely out of systems that are frugal in 
the way they access information of other systems.
These design constraints also shed light on how modules 
should be individuated in principle. Each reliably recurring 
function that the human mind is requested to perform is 
apparently realized by an underlying system. Whenever an 
executed function is complex, the system in question is 
structured as an array of subsystems.
It is impossible to specify precisely how many modules there 
are, since the traditional faculties all divide into multiple 
subsystems. Not only can the memory system already be 
partitioned into working memory and long-term memory, but 
long-term memory can again be divided into explicit and 
implicit memory; explicit memory in turn separates out into 
episodic and semantic memory, where semantic memory, once 
again, splits off into multiple subsystems, and so on. Such a 
multiplication of faculties at the subpersonal level mirrors a 
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general tendency in modern cognitive science when compared 
with traditional faculty psychology. Nowadays, traditional 
faculties, such as memory, tend to be divided into more fine-
grained subsystems, which are not meant to be accessible 
from the first person perspective but are  (p.290) instead 
presupposed with respect to certain theoretical background 
assumptions and empirical research methods.
While the tendency to trade in traditional faculties for more 
fine-grained, subpersonal mechanisms is already present in 
Fodor, and in cognitive science quite generally, massive 
modularists depart from faculty psychology in yet another 
sense. Where Fodor left the distinction between higher and 
lower cognitive faculties untouched and mirrored 
Cartesianism in the belief that higher faculties cannot be 
explained as computational mechanisms, massive modularists 
tend to blur the distinction between lower and higher faculties 
by suggesting instead a system of gradual differences 
extending between human and animal minds. Rather than 
simply assuming one central system, Carruthers lists more 
than twenty uniquely human capacities that point to various 
specifically human adaptations of the mental structure. The 
capacities that Carruthers cites range from a capacity for folk-
physics, which facilitates deeper causal reasoning, to the 
ability to produce gossip, learn social norms, or acquire 
complex skills.
The most important additions to the human brain that account 
for the anthropological difference are a mind-reading system, 
capable of attributing mental states to others and oneself; a 
language learning system, designed to build modular 
production and comprehension systems suited to the 
surrounding language; and a normative reasoning and 
motivation system, which assists in forming judgments about 
what is permitted or prohibited and also generates relevant 
motivations. Furthermore, humans have an innate disposition 
for creatively generating and rehearsing action plans by 
utilizing a variety of heuristics and constraints.
The general reasoning capacity, which, according to Fodor, is 
implemented by the central system, is mainly realized in 
operational cycles of existing modular systems and their 
mutual interactions. The language module plays a particularly 
prominent role in this process, since Carruthers takes it to be 
responsible for the seemingly unlimited content flexibility of 
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the human mind. The particular human kind of  (p.291) 
reasoning is also slower, and conscious reasoning is 
accomplished in virtue of the “global broadcasting” of sensory 
representations of utterances in inner speech as well as other 
action rehearsals.
Carruthers manages to develop a comprehensive account of 
the mental architecture mainly by applying adaptationist 
reasoning. His particular strategy involves multiplying 
traditional faculties in terms of task-specific mechanisms that 
can only be individuated at a subpersonal level and redirecting 
the theoretical focus away from the strict traditional 
distinction between lower and higher faculties and toward an 
architecture of the mind that is incremental all the way up. Yet 
Carruthers’s account and the approach to modularity of 
evolutionary psychology in general has not remained 
unchallenged.
5. The Critique of Modularity and Contemporary 
Reasoning about Faculties
Many people argue that, while Fodor’s notion of a module is 
too strong, proponents of massive modularity, like Carruthers, 
Daniel Sperber, and Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, are 
weakening this notion to such a degree that to claim that the 
mind is modular becomes uninformative. Evolutionary 
psychology has been, furthermore, heavily criticized quite 
generally for its highly speculative approach to the mind.58 It 
is therefore not surprising that the notion of the mental 
module has rarely been deployed in recent years. Yet the 
question of how to carve up the mind remains an open project. 
While there has been little explicit debate about mental 
faculties lately, many discussions have instead revolved around 
the details of functional decomposition, realizing mechanisms, 
and the supervenience base of mental abilities. These debates 
take place in newly transformed scientific contexts that now 
rely on neuroscientific studies and biological research on 
niche construction,  (p.292) or form part of the work on 
embodied and situated cognition. These debates also open up 
new ways of thinking about mental faculties, and we will 
therefore provide a brief sketch of these developments in the 
following.
Jesse Prinz articulates a critique both of the Fodorian 
approach and evolutionary psychology, arguing that the 
neuroscientific perspective suggests instead that the 
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mammalian brain uses the same areas for different functions 
and that neither domain-specific rules nor many interesting 
cases of encapsulation are to be found. Significantly, sensory 
cells have turned out to be often bimodal and to be used, for 
example, for both vision and touch. There is also plenty of 
evidence on cross-modal perception, on top-down effects in 
perception, and so on.59 An ability such as mind reading, 
which, according to Carruthers and others, represents a prime 
example of a module, has been shown in neuroimaging studies 
to recruit language centers in the left frontal cortex, visuo-
spatial areas in the right temporal-parietal regions, the 
amygdala, and the precuneus (involved in mental image 
assessments)—that is, mind reading seems to exploit a large 
network of structures that contribute also to many other 
capacities. The upshot of Prinz’s argument is that neither 
Fodor nor Carruthers carve out interesting divisions within the 
mind. Instead, the mind ought to be described as a network of 
interconnected systems and subsystems and not as a collection 
of encapsulated domain-specific modules.
Many people have criticized the method of evolutionary 
psychology quite generally and its assumptions about the 
modularity of the mind more particularly. It has been argued 
that brain evolution would not design a brain that consisted of 
numerous prefabricated adaptations, as evolutionary 
psychology would have it, but instead has produced a brain 
that is capable of adapting to its local environment.60 In this 
vein,  (p.293) various authors have pointed out that 
evolutionary psychology both overestimates the role of 
hardwired, genetically determined mechanisms and 
underestimates the roles of the ecological niche, of learning 
abilities, and of cooperative foraging being practiced across 
generations within an ecological niche.61
While Prinz criticizes mainly the narrow notion of a module, 
suggesting a more liberal way of conceiving of the functional 
decomposition of the mind, recent years have also seen a more 
radical critique of the modularity approach. This criticism is 
part of a general turn in cognitive science away from the 
computationalist paradigm and toward a focus on the 
interrelation between brain, body, and world. Embodied and 
situated cognition approaches have criticized the attitude of 
identifying the mind with the brain only and of conceptualizing 
the brain as a symbol-processing computer. The mind, 
according to these approaches, should rather be understood 
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as a collection of abilities that evolved in agents being 
endowed with particular bodies within specific surroundings: 
accordingly, language development is claimed to be dependent 
on the use of material symbols and the bodily ability of 
gesturing, perception is said to be closely intertwined with 
action, and memory to be bounded by certain contexts, 
including distinct social relations.62 This way of thinking about 
the mind calls the traditional view about the architecture of 
the mind and also the concept of a module into question. 
Dynamical systems theory rejects the decomposition of the 
mind into separate modules and instead highlights the close 
couplings between various parts of the brain and between the 
(p.294) body and the environment.63 It has been suggested in 
this vein that on the subpersonal level the distinction between 
cognition and emotion would not make any sense since 
emotional and cognitive activities both result from the activity 
of a variety of brain areas, none of which is exclusively 
dedicated to emotional or cognitive processing.64 The general 
idea that traditional faculties, such as emotion and cognition, 
have no counterpart at the subpersonal level has been 
developed in the work of Hurley, who has established this 
claim with respect to perception and action.65 Hurley, 
furthermore, criticizes what she calls the “sandwich model” of 
the mind, that is, the view that perception and action are 
distinct elements each lodged at the periphery of the mind 
while cognition forms the “hearty filling.” Hurley argues that 
perception and action need to interact closely in order for 
percepts and intentions to have any content at all. She 
furthermore suggests that we might think of the modularity of 
the mind not so much in terms of, for example, perception, 
cognition, and action being separate parts of the mind that 
process information in a one-way linear order. (She labels this 
concept “vertical modularity” and attributes it to Fodor.) 
According to Hurley, we should rather conceive domain-
specific modules as being “horizontally modular,” namely, 
consider the quite different notion of a module such that our 
various mental abilities can be described as “layers” of the 
mind that will both engage action and perception systems and 
involve certain environmental conditions.66
Hurley’s idea, which originates in dynamical systems theory, is 
reformulated in a more modest version by William Bechtel, 
who suggests that we should think of the whole organism as 
an autonomous system aimed at maintaining itself, being 
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separated from its environments yet  (p.295) closely 
interacting with it.67 Such an organism comprises component 
mechanisms that perform the necessary operations for 
maintaining themselves and are organized in such a way that 
they can also operate in unison. According to Bechtel, we 
should carve up the mind in terms of these incrementally 
evolved mechanisms that might interact closely with each 
other and their environment. Such mechanisms differ from 
encapsulated modules, however, because they allow for a 
much greater degree of crosstalk between the systems. Yet 
they also present a clear functional structure of the mind that 
can be said to be responsible for all kinds of intelligent 
behavior that we display.
It is eye-catching that the critique of the faculties, as it has 
been articulated in recent research, resembles ideas put 
forward by pragmatists and existentialists in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their central idea 
was that the interaction between subject and world is prior to 
an “internal structure” or “essence” of the mind. The recent 
turn back to pragmatist ideas is largely due to the role that the 
neurosciences have started to play. Research on the location of 
the faculties in the brain was prominent all along in the 
neurosciences through the nineteenth century and large parts 
of the twentieth. While these studies have been central for the 
modularity hypothesis, the philosophical critique of modularity 
derives its main impulse from neuroscientific studies, which 
suggest that there are no faculty-specific areas in the brain. 
Recent critique of the modularity hypothesis is not a critique 
of neuroscientific approaches to the architecture of the mind 
per se. It is rather a critique that uses insights from 
neuroscience itself to criticize traditional accounts of the 
faculties and current versions of the modularity hypothesis 
alike. These new developments might make it seem as if 
theorizing about the modularity of mind might have been 
nothing but a brief interlude in the long decline of the faculties 
throughout modern times.
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 (p.296) 6. Conclusion
We have seen that, while theorizing about the faculties and 
their locations in the brain has been prominent in the 
neurosciences all through the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, such theorizing was frowned on at the very same 
time by philosophers and psychologists. The tide turned with 
the rise of cognitivism and a return to the inner structures of 
the mind from the 1960s onward. The discussion about the 
modularity of the mind has its roots there. Modules, as we 
have pointed out, represent successor concepts of traditional 
faculties within current naturalistic theories about the 
architecture of the mind. In the work of Fodor, Carruthers, and 
others, modules are defined as those parts of the mind that 
can be individuated according to their function and, therefore, 
need to be understood as underlying our mental abilities. 
Modules do not capture folk-psychological categories but 
rather subpersonal mechanisms that are assumed by science. 
A main reason for introducing modules is the belief that 
behaviorist and associationist theorizing about the mind 
cannot explain our learning abilities on a broad scale, the way 
our cognitive states are content-sensitive, and how our mental 
abilities differ from one another.
Fodor and Carruthers are both functionalists and naturalists 
about the mind, yet each devises a rather different account. As 
we have shown, this is mainly due to the diverging naturalist 
paradigms operating in the background: While Fodor is 
arguing in the spirit of “good old-fashioned artificial 
intelligence,”68 conceiving of input-systems as inference-
producing encapsulated mechanisms, Carruthers applies 
adaptationist notions to the mental structure and therefore 
utilizes very different design principles.
The modularity debate is not only a debate that is situated 
within a naturalistic framework, it is also a debate about that 
very naturalistic framework. As we have shown, Fodor’s 
moderate modularity thesis  (p.297) holds that the central 
cognitive systems are nonmodular and that cognitive science 
has no means of understanding the global processing of 
nonmodular systems. Yet since cognitive science is the only 
game in town when it comes to a naturalistic understanding of 
the mind, the prospects for naturalism look quite bleak. From 
a broader historical perspective, the debate initiated by Fodor 
is at its core a debate about our understanding of the higher 
mental faculties that are characteristic of the human mind. Are 
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these faculties—the higher-level cognitive systems—to be 
explained within the naturalistic framework of cognitive 
science and evolutionary theory? Descartes thought that, in 
contrast to the lower faculties, the higher faculties of will and 
intellect cannot be explanatory targets within a general 
science of the material world. Fodor seems to agree. 
Evolutionary psychologists on the other hand aim to develop 
an account of the mind that is modular all the way up, since 
evolution forces us to conceive of the mind as a system that 
developed incrementally. Evolutionary psychologists therefore 
blur the distinction between lower and higher faculties. One 
might be skeptical about the kind of adaptationist reasoning 
that justifies massive modularity approaches. Yet it remains an 
interesting fact that evolutionary psychologists have started to 
doubt the unity of the higher faculties and to suggest splitting 
them up into specialized modules because they believe that the 
evolution of a global system such as “reason” is close to 
impossible in an evolutionary framework of explanation.
Current embodied approaches do not question the naturalist 
framework and stick with the idea that the mind developed 
incrementally, but they argue from a scientific perspective that 
assumes that there are no modules akin to task-specific 
locatable areas in the brain that realize mental abilities. 
Instead, embodied and dynamicist theories suggest that 
naturalist approaches to the mind fare better if they describe 
cognitive systems as systems that become established in the 
interaction between an embodied agent and a structured 
environment. In this way, they rekindle pragmatist ideas about 
the primacy of action and revive them in the framework of 
cognitive science. While the modularity  (p.298) debate has 
been dominated by the question about whether the faculties 
can be understood in a naturalist framework, it seems that 
most sections of cognitive science are pretty efficient 
nowadays in describing the mechanisms that realize cognitive 
abilities without assuming modules or anything faculty-like in 
the background.69
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